What happens to science advice to policy when science speaks with multiple voices? How does pluralism affect the science policy interface? Is pluralism irreducible or can it be governed? In this post, I review three approaches to governance in the context of pluralism.
1. Science speaking consensus to power
The first approach to pluralism is science speaking consensus to power (van der Sluijs et al. 2010). The concept of consensus is based on what O’Connor identifies as the Laplacian perspective on reconciliation between different worldviews, which seeks reconciliation through “a single and internally consistent conceptual framework” (1999: 672).
The Laplacian view resonates with Neurath’s insistence on the need for an orchestration between different disciplines to achieve a more complete description of reality. Neurath (1946) reconciles the existence of a plurality of experiences with the infallibility of empiricism by arguing that apparent differences in perception by different disciplines should be seen as complementary views of the world, and calls for an “orchestration of sciences.”
This perspective can also be found in the ideal of deliberative democracy. Brown (2009) defines deliberative democracy as a way of taming pluralism through dialogue following the Habermasian view of communication. Habermas’ work on modernity and communicative action is based on an ideal community, rather than on empirical work, to construct a theory of “unconstrained mutual understanding among individuals” (Habermas, 1989: 2). According to this view, differences can be reconciled through communication.
Within this perspective, the science-policy interface is based on the ideal of seeking consensus and reducing the plurality of worldviews to one single view. Uncertainty can be managed through scientific consensus. The presence of pluralism does not fundamentally alter the relationship between science and policy envisioned in the modern model of Funtowicz and Strand (2007). In this interpretation, pluralism is a temporary obstacle that can be dealt with through communication. Pluralism is tamed by processes of reconciliation within science, which make it possible for science to speak with one voice to power. The existence of non-equivalent worldviews implies a move away from the view of science as describing reality as it is towards that of science as the locus for consensus among different worldviews. Pluralism is narrowly defined as any deviation from rationality, hence behaviours that differ from the so-called rational are explained in terms of bounded rationality. The role of science is that of educating and leading differing views towards rationality.
According to this model, science retains a primary role in defining what should be observed and how. This approach to pluralism is compatible with a technocratic approach to governance. Pluralism is reduced to consensus through the instrumental use of science portrayed as neutral knowledge (Ezrahi 1990). Wynne argues that “technocrats have often bemoaned the fact that society unlike science, has no consensually defined goals, that can act as the springboard to the development of a consensual framework of social values and norms” (1975: 113). In the technocratic approach, the public is often constructed as ignorant (Jasanoff & Kim 2009), irrational (Wynne 1975), and suffering from an engagement deficit (Ballo 2015). Technocratic governance thus favours scientific knowledge above all other knowledge claims, based on its ability to warrant rationality.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a classic example of science speaking consensus to power (van der Sluijs et al. 2010). The IPCC states that its mission is to “ensure an objective and complete assessment of current information” (IPCC 2015) thus acknowledging the existence of a plurality of scientists and research methods being used in relation to climate change, but still seeking to reach a consensus on the relevance and significance of the different views available (as suggested by the term “objective assessment”).
2. Working deliberatively within imperfection
The second approach to pluralism is working deliberatively within imperfection (van der Sluijs et al. 2010). In this case, the possibility of reconciliation is questioned. O’Connor (1999) speaks of a dialogical perspective, which looks for a coexistence of irreducible pluralities. The dialogical view of reconciliation is more in line with the notion of incommensurable worldviews proposed by Munda (2005), which has deeper implications than that of expressing different points of view. In other words, different worldviews are not necessarily complementary and not always compatible with each other because they refer to non-equivalent representations of the world (Giampietro et al. 2006).
High levels of uncertainty, which can be seen as imperfections of knowledge, imply that different disciplines may not advance towards a full unity of knowledge (Douguet et al. 2009). This implies that the orchestration of sciences called forth by Neurath is not so easy to achieve, independently of the use of scientific methods and independently of the transparency of the process of production of scientific information. As Strand and Cañellas-Boltà point out, it is important to reflect upon which “lines of action will be underestimated, discredited or forgotten” by the consideration of a plurality of legitimate perspectives ( 2006: 203).
Irreducible pluralism poses also a critique to the use of a single explanatory factor for human behaviour, such as the idea of rationality used in microeconomics both by the neo-classical and Keynesian schools. There is a very broad literature criticising the rational economic agent model, (see for example Sen, 2001; Simon, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and suggesting a variety of complementary factors to be taken into account, such as reciprocity (Polanyi 1944), the need for affirmation of one’s identity (Arendt 1958), solidarity (Singer 2002). Pluralism becomes irreducible when one accepts the complexity and diversity of human beings and their ways of knowing.
The dialogical view can be associated with Rhodes’ (2007) concept of differentiated polity. Rhodes argues that differentiation within the British government has led to a multiplication of networks with a high degree of interdependence, reducing the capacity of the core executive to steer. Pluralism in this case leads to a redefinition of democracy itself. A similar concept is put forward by Brown’s (2009) idea of agonistic democracy, which sees controversies as irreducible and calls for a re-conceptualisation of democracy itself.
In this context, the science-policy interface is also challenged. In the postmodernist school, the relationship between science and policy is deconstructed as a criticism to the very possibility of dialogue between science and governance. Lyotard (1979) suggests the concept of paralogy, defined as the movement against the establishment of a given narrative, and as a way of testing the legitimacy of the knowledge claims used to inform policy. Lyotard’s critique of modernity (and of Habermas) rejects the idea of communicative rationality on the grounds of scepticism towards the ability of communication to go beyond language games. Irreducible uncertainty leads to “the perspective of mobilising incomplete knowledge and exploring considerations of pertinence of knowledge as a function of context” (Douguet et al., 2009: 43).
In the presence of irreducible pluralism, the role of science becomes that of guaranteeing the pertinence, or quality, of the knowledge used for governance. Post-normal science is a representative example of this approach. Post-normal science is defined as a situation in which stakes are high (irreducible pluralism) and uncertainty is high (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993). Working deliberatively refers to the use of participatory processes, or “an extended peer review” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993) to deal with uncertainty. Therefore a participatory governance model is envisioned in order to deal with irreducible pluralism.
In the top step of her ladder of participation, Arnstein (1969) speaks of citizen control to describe a situation in which participation is not aimed at consensus but rather allows for a plurality of knowledge claims to enter the debate and for the dominant narrative to be questioned. Arnstein poses a fierce critique to the technocratic use of participation as a means to reach consensus through placation or, at worst, manipulation of the public. In the participatory governance model, the public is constructed as a legitimate source of knowledge.
3. Reflexive governance
The question of pertinence of knowledge leads to the third model of science and policy in the context of pluralism, which is based on reflexivity. In this case, pluralism is not something to be governed, but rather the starting point from which to analyse the science-policy interface. The third approach consists of Voss and colleagues’ reflexive governance, which deals the “specific dimensions of problem handling such as analysis, goal definition, assessment or strategy implementation” (Voss et al., 2006: 7). The pluralism of problem framings and policy recommendations leads to a critical reconsideration of the way science is produced for policy and of the governance processes in place. In this case, pluralism is not seen as something external (Skeie 1995), but as part of the identity of science itself. Thus the goal is no longer that of dealing with pluralism, but rather pluralism creates the necessity of reviewing the science-policy interface. The assessment of the science-policy interface is carried out through reflexivity, that is, the analysis of one’s own assumptions, goals and course of action.
The concept of reflexivity in reflexive governance is used to refer to the assessment of the science-policy interface, and can be associated with the notion of reflexivity used by Beck and colleagues in reflexive modernisation (Beck et al. 1994). Beck and colleagues argue that modernisation leads to a breakdown of traditional values, institutions, personal identities and challenges the science-policy interface. In this context, science is faced more and more with risk, uncertainty and complexity, leading to a reflexive assessment of its own practices. Beck and colleagues’ concept of risk is illustrative of this attitude: uncertainty in this case is not something that can be managed but rather something that redefines the very nature of society (which is redefined by these authors as “risk society”).
The third approach can be understood as a further development of the assessment of science for policy as a function of context, which leads to an assessment of the quality assessment (Douguet et al. 2009). Reflexivity about the practices of governance and of science leads to a redefinition of those practices, which Voss and colleagues define as second-order reflexivity (Voss et al. 2006).
Reflexive modernity also arises as a critique to the deconstructionism of postmodernity (Beck et al. 1994). Reflexivity is taken as a means to reconstruct the relationship between science, policy and society. The main difference between reflexive governance and the previous approaches is that latter is not concerned with reconciliation and with the implications of pluralism for democracy and for scientific knowledge, but rather with the way scientific practices are affected by pluralism. There is a shift from epistemological pluralism as the basis for action, towards knowledge about uncertainty as the basis for renewing the science-policy interface (Beck et al. 2003).
However, it should be noted that reflexivity is not a quick fix to deal with controversies. Reflexivity should rather be understood as a martial art (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992), that is, a set of analytical tools that make it possible to shed light over the sources of controversy based on the analysis of the motivations, beliefs and social context of different observers. Bourdieu refers to martial arts in as far as these analytical tools serve to enhance understanding rather than as a tool for active intervention in the world.
In this case, there is no well-defined model of governance to deal with pluralism. Reflexivity leads to what Strand and Cañellas-Boltà define as “messy governance” (2006), that is, a situation in which science-policy issues are not governed through blue print models, but rather require flexibility both in the identification of the relevant knowledge claims, which may vary from case to case, and in the definition of the policy option space (Pielke 2004), as opposed to the quest for the so-called optimal solution.
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